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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
REGINALD WILLIAMS, 
Petitioner/ Appellant, 
V. Case No. 20140623-CA 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 
@ et al., 
Respondents/ Appellees. 
RESPONSE BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS/ APPELLEES 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This action challenges the conditio_ns of the petitioner's confinement and comes 
within this Court's original jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2).(f) (West 
ViJ Supp. 2014). 
I~ 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. The Utah State Prison (Prison) provides its inmates with contract attorneys to 
assist inmates in drafting and filing initial pleadings in civil rights actions regarding 
current confinement or a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Carper v. DeLand, 54 F .3d 
613, 617 (10th Cir. 1995). Williams' Second Amended Petition for Extraordinary Relief 
(SAP) claims that this legal assistance is constitutionally inadequate. Did the trial court 
err in holding that the Prison had no duty to provide any further legal assistance to 
Williams? 
PRESERVATION and STANDARD OF REVIEW: The trial court based its 
dismissal of most of Williams' SAP on this issue. R. 758-62. The trial court's decisions 
on questions of law are reviewed for correctness. Lancaster v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 869 
P.2d 945,947 (Utah App. 1995). 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it denied Williams' motion to 
disqualify the Utah Attorney General's Office? 
PRESERVATION and STANDARD OF REVIEW: The trial court entered its 
ruling on this issue on January 21, 2014. R. 641-54. Trial judges have considerable 
discretion in deciding motions-to disqualify.attorneys and their decisions will only be 
overturned when that discretion is exceeded. State v. LoPrinzi, 2014 UT App 256, ,I 9, 
338 P .3d 2,53. 
3. Did the trial court err in denying Williams' bill of costs? 
PRESERVATION and STANDARD OF REVIEW: The trial court entered its 
ruling on this issue on May 6, 2014. R. 696-97. Generally an award of costs is within the 
sound discretion of the trial court, but questions of whether there has been compliance 
with the mandatory procedures for seeking costs will be reviewed for correctness. Brown 
v. Jorgensen, 2006 UT App 168, ·111, 136 P.3d 1252. 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
There are no determinative statutes or rules. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Williams filed his petition for extraordinary relief, independent action, petition for 
review of records denial on July 21, 2011. R. 1-34. Williams also filed a motion to 
recuse (disqualify) the Utah Attorney General's Office from representing the Prison in 
this matter. R. 105-11. Without deciding the motion to recuse, the trial court dismissed 
this matter on December 13, 2011. R. 263-67. Williams appealed, and this Court 
:.iJ reversed and remanded. R. 311-12; Williams v. Dep't of Corr., 2013 UT App 159,306 
P.3d 821. This Court awarded Williams his costs incurred on appeal that were to be 
determined by the trial court. R. 515-17. On May 6, 2014, the trial court denied 
Williams' bill of cost as being untimely, and not being itemized nor verified. R. 696-97. 
The trial court denied Williams' motion to disqualify on January 21, 2014. R. 641-
55. Williams filed a second am~nded petition (SAP) on June 2, 2014. R. 704-25. The 
trial court dismissed the SAP on July 1, 2014, without serving it on the respondents. R. 
~ 757-66. Williams timely filed the present appeal. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Access to the Courts 
The Department of Corrections' administrative rules provide access to the courts 
for the Prison's inmates through contract attorneys. Utah Admin. Code R251~707-3(4) 
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("the primary means of access to legal services shall be p~ovided by contract attorneys 
paid by the Department"). The rules also limit what legal assistance will be provided by 
thes·e contract attorneys. 
It is the policy of the Department that: ( 1) legal assistance shall be 
provided to assist inmates in preparing and filing of an initial pleading in 
habeas and civil rights suits challenging conditions of confinement arising 
from incarceration at the prison; 
Id. at (I). 
The rules do not call for any other legal assistance to be provided as. an alternative 
to that specified in the rules. 
Motion to Disqualify 
On March 30, 2011, before.this matter was filed, Assistant Attorney General 
Matthew B. Anderson realized that he had given Williams copies of two documents that 
were protected by GRAMA and should not have been disclosed. 1 R. 417, 451-53, 645. 
Williams' legal pouches were taken, unopened, to the Warden's office. Id. The Prison's 
contract attorneys inspected the legal pouches to divide the materials in those that were 
legal-privileged (and could not be searched by the respondents) and those that were legal-
public (such as case law, rules of procedure, legal books, pleadings filed with a court, 
etc., that could be searched ~y the respondents). R. 433,646. Contract attorney Wayne 
1 These documents are identified in the record as the "Chase proposal" and the 
"Shreve letters." R. 649. 
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A. Freestone determined that all of the material in Williams' legal pouches was legal-
public, and none of it was legal-privileged. R. 403, 646. 
Assistant Attorney General Anderson, in the presence of Warden Bigelow, then 
searched Williams' legal-public materials to retrieve the documents he had inadvertently 
given to Williams. R. _419, 498. He did not read or even skim most of the documents. R. 
419. 
Bill of Costs . 
This Court awarded Williams his costs incurred on appeal. R. 515. This Court 
vil furthered ordered that Williams file, with the trial court, an itemized and verified bill of 
costs incurred on appeal within 15 days after remittitur to the trial court. Id. The 
reqiittitur was filed with the trial court on September 16, 2013. R. 553. Williams' bill of 
cost was not filed until October 17, 2013. R. 591-608. The bill of cost does not include a 
certificate of service, though it is dated September 18, 2013. R. 592. 
The trial judge noted that: 
Although Petitioner included a mailing certificate, dated October 9, 
2013, with his Response to Respondents' Objection to First Amended 
Petition, dated September 30, 2013, which followed his last exhibit to his 
Bill of Costs, Petitioner did not include a mailing certificate for his Bill of 
Costs. 
R. 696 at n.6. 
• While providing pages of his inmate account statement as exhibits .(R. 594-602). 
Williams failed to state what amount of costs he sought (R. 592) and did not identify 
5 
which transactions found in his exhibits related to his costs incurred on appeal. Only after 
respondents' objections to Williams' bill of costs was filed (R. 609-11 ), did Williams 
provide the amount of costs he sought. R. 618. But Williams still failed to explain how 
he arrived at the claimed amount of costs. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Williams, as an inmate, has a right to access to the courts. But this right is limited. 
The Prison is not required to provide legal assistance beyond helping Williams with the 
preparation of initial pleadings in civil rights and habeas corpus matters regarding his 
current confinement. 
The Prison's. contract attorneys are not required to assist Williams in other legal 
matters. They are not required to prepare notices of claim for tort actions .or other legal 
proceedings. The Prison does not have a duty to assist Williams· in doing his own legal 
research or providing copies of legal material through its contra~t attorneys. 
Even a failure to provide adequate access to the courts would not.state a claim 
against the Prison. Williams would also have to show that he had been actually injured. 
This he failed to do. The trial court did not err in denying Williams' access to the courts 
claims. 
Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying Williams' motion to 
disqualify the Utah Attorney General's Office. There was no evidence that any legal-
privileged documents were searched in the effort to retrieve the documents that had been 
6 
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erroneously provided to Williams. Williams failed to show how this search should lead to 
"" the disqualification of the entire Utah Attorney General's Office. 
Williams' bill of costs was filed untimely. It did not state the amount of costs 
sought. It did not identify which of many transactions in the records provided Williams 
believed were related to his appeal. When Williams finally provided the amount of costs 
he sought, filed with his reply, he still failed to identify any specific information to 
support his claim. The trial court's denial of his bill of costs should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. WILLIAMS' RIGHT OF ACCESS TO THE COURTS WAS NOT 
VIOLATED 
An inmate's right of access to the courts requires the prison to provide either 
~ adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law, but not 
both. Carper v. Deland, 54 F.3d 613, 616 (10 th Cir. 1995) (upholding the Utah State 
Prison's access to the courts plan as meeting the constitutional needs of Utah's inmates). 
This duty to supply assistance applies only to the preparation and filing of initial . 
pleadings in civil rights actions concerning current conditions of confinement or a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 617 ("Further, an inmate's right of access does 
not require the state to supply legal assistance beyond the preparation of initial pleadings 
~ in a civil rights action regarding current confinement or a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus."). 
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The Utah State Prison provides its inmates assistance by contracting with persons 
trained in the law to meet this duty. R. 760~ Utah's program has been upheld as meeting 
the constitutional requirements by the United States Tenth Circuit Court in Carner and in 
Bee v. Utah State Prison, 823 F.2d 397 (10 th Cir. 1987) (Utah did not need to provide 
illiterate inmate with assistance beyond the initial pleading stage). The trial court 
properly denied Williams' claims that he had a constitutional right to further legal 
assistance. No such right exists. 
Williams has no constitutional right to unlimited free photocopies. R. 705-06. 
The Prison has no duty to provide anything more than legal assistance in the preparation 
and filing of initial pleadings in a civil rights action regarding current confinement or a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The trial judge correctly held that there was no duty 
to assist Williams in filing ORAMA requests (R. 764) or other proceedings. The trial 
court ·correctly rejected WiHiams ~ccess to courts claims on th~ merits. R. 758-64. 
To state a claim of denial of access to the courts, Williams would also be required 
to show that he had suffered actual injury. Lewis v. Casey~ 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996). 
The trial judge correctly noted that: 
To satisfy the "actual injury" requirement a petitioner must show "that the 
denial oflegal resources hindered the prisoner's efforts to pursue a 




Williams failed to demonstrate that: I) he was denied legal assistance in the filing 
\rj) of an initial pleading in a civil rights claim concerning his current incarceration or a 
habeas corpus petition; and, 2) that a claim that he was hindered in the pursuit of a non-
frivolous claim. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING WILLIAMS' MOTION TO DISQUALIFY THE UTAH 
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE 
Williams motion to disqualify the entire Utah Attorney General's Office is based 
on his unsupported allegations concerning a search of his inmate legal pouch. Williams 
~ has not shown what legal-privileged documents were supposedly seized by Assistant 
Attorney General Matthew B. Anderson. 
Contract attorney Wayne A. Freestone determined that all of the material in the 
legal pouches in question was legal-public, and none of it was legal-privileged. R. 403, 
646. No privileged documents were given to Mr. Anderson in his effort to retrieve the 
Shreve and Chase documents that he had erroneously provided to Williams. 
The trial court reviewed those few documents presented to it by Williams and 
~ found that most were not privileged. R. 643-50. The trial court found that the undisputed 
facts showed that no protected documents had been disclosed to Mr. Anderson. R. 650. 
The trial court explained that it was not provided by Williams with the documents 
that Williams referred to, such as unfiled complaints. R. 643. This is not a situation 
where an attorney who previously represented Williams .had now joined an opposing law 
9 
firm or government agency. State v. McClellan, 2009 UT 50,216 P.3d 956. Even there, 
the Supreme Court rejected a per se rule of disqualification and permitted the 
presumption to be rebutted. Id. at ,r 19. 
Williams has not addressed the trial court's actual grounds for denying Williams' 
motion to disqualify. The trial court held that there had been no violation of either Rules 
1.9, 1.10, or 1.11 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. R. 651-63. Disqualification 
was not proper where "neither Mr. Anderson, nor any other member of the AG, has 
represented or is currently representing [Williams] in the entitled manner." R. 653. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED WILLIAMS' 
UNTIMELY AND INADEQUATE BILL OF COSTS 
Having granted Williams cost incurred in his appeal (Williams v. Department of 
Corrections, 2013 UT App 159,306 P.3d 821), this Court ordered Williams to file his 
itemized and verified bill of costs incurred on appeal within 15 days after remittitur to the 
trial court. R. 515. The remittitur was filed with the trial court on September 16, 2013. 
R. 553. Williams' bill of cost was not filed until October 17, 2013. R. 591-608. The bill 
of cost does not include a certificate of service, though it is dated September 18, 2013. R. 
592. 
The timely filing of a bill of costs is mandatory. Utah R. App. P. 34(d). Indeed, 
this Court expressly stated in its order that "[Williams] shall serve upon the State and file 
with the clerk of the trial court an itemized and verified bill of costs incurred on appeal, 
within 15 days after remittitur~" R. 515. Dealing with Utah Civil Procedure Rule 54(d) 
10 
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(requiring that a party claiming costs in the trial court "must within 14 days after the entry 
of judgment serve". his claim for costs upon the adverse parties and the court), this Court 
has held that the untimely filed claim for costs must be denied. Brown v. Jorgensen, 2006 
UT App 168, ,r 27,136 P.3d 1252. 
Nor can Williams rely on Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 2l{f) relating to 
papers filed by inmates. Rule 21 (t) applies only if the paper is "deposited in the 
institution's internal mail system on or before the last day for filing." Williams failure to 
provide a certificate of mailing precludes this Court from knowing when the bill of costs 
was mailed. 
Moreover, Williams did not comply with Rule 21(f)'s requirement that timely 
filing be shown by a notarized statement or written declaration "setting forth the date of 
deposit and stating that first-class postage has been prepaid." Id. No such document 
appears in the record. Nothing indicates how or when the bill of costs was sent to the trial 
court. The trial court did not err in rejecting Williams' bill of costs as untimely. 
While providing pages of his inmate account statement as exhibits (R. 594-602). 
Williams' bill o_f costs failed to state what amount of costs h~ sought (R. 592) and did not 
identify which transactions found in his exhibits related to his costs incurred on appeal. 
Only after respon~ents' objections to Williams' bill of costs was filed (R. 609-11), did 
Williams provide the amount of costs he sought. R. 618. But Williams still failed to 
demonstrate how he arrived at the amount he claimed as costs. The trial court did not 
11 
abuse its discretion in denying Williams' bill of costs. Brown v. Jorgensen, 2006 UT App 
168, 1 11, 136 P.3d 1252. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, respondents/appellees ask this Court to affirm the 
challenged decisions of the trial court. 
Respectfully submitted this / J.Jd day of April, 2015. 
~~-~ 
BRENT A. BURNETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondents 
12 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and exact copies of the foregoing Response 
Brief of Respondents/ Appellees, postage prepaid, to the following on this /.5.Y( day 
of April, 2015: 
Reginald Williams 
Inmate # 4620 
UTAH STATE PRISON 
P. 0. Box250 
Draper, UT 84020 
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Case No. 110918680 
Judge: L.A. DEVER 
The above matter is before the Court- on Petitioner's Request to Submit for 
Decision his Motion to (1) Disqualify Counsel, (2) Sever Claims, and (3} Amend 
·Petition; and Petitioner's Motion for Award of-Costs, fifed November 18, 2013. Having 
reviewed Petitioner's Petition and Respondents' Opposition thereto, and being duly 
~ advised of the premises of each, the Court makes the following Ruling. 
Because the Utah Court of Appeals has advised that Petitioner's Motion to 
Disqualify be "disposed"1 of before proceeding to the merits of Petitioner's claims, 
Williams v. Dep1 of Corr., 2013 UT App 159, 1J 6, 306 P.3d 821, this Court shall 
· 
1This Court interprets the Court of Appeal's suggestion that a final disposition must be rendered 
on said matter before this Court may proceed to address any of Petitioner's other claims. Accordingly, all 
other matters submitted for consideration are HEREBY STAYED pending the final disposition of 
Petitioner's Motion ·to Disqualify Counsel. 
- -
ILf 1 
address, at ·this time, Petitioner's Motion to Disqualify Counsel. 
Background 
Petitioner originally filed his Motion to· "Recusen2 on October 4, 2011, in 
conjunction with his Opposition to Respondents' Motion to Dismiss. Petitioner requests 
that the Office of the Utah State Attorney General ("AG") be disqualified. (Pet'r's Opp. 
to Mol to Dismiss, Mot. to Recuse, 6). Petitioner asserts that on March 31, 2011, the 
Utah Department of Corrections ("UDC") officials confiscated his "legal materials113 and 
provid~d them to Assistant Attorney General Matthew B. Anderson4• Respondent.' 
(Pet'r's Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss, Mot. to Recuse, 2). Petitioner further alleges that Mr. 
Anderson "search[ed) and read [his] legal rnaterials including unfifed complaints,_ letters 
to attorneys and work-product preparation of future legal actions." Id. (citing Pet. 3R-
3S5). After Mr. Anderson allegedly read Petitioner's legal materials, he contact~ 
Virginia Smith of Zions Bank "regarding oth~ issues contained in [Petitioner's] untiled 
~mpl~int against Zions Bank." · 1d. at 6. Petitioner contends that due to M_r. 
Anderson's search and review of his legal materials, Respondents were given an "unfair ·. 
advantage in defending themselves against [Petitioner's] claims in this action. ff Id. 
2Petitioner misconstrues the tenn 11recuse." In the context of Petitioner's Motion, Petitioner was 
requesting the <;:ourt to "disqualify" the relevant party as counsel. 
3Petitioner does not specify the particular legal materials that were divulged. See also fn. 2. 
· "Mr. Anderson serves In the AG's Cri~inal Justice DiVislon, Corrections S~on, representing th~ 
UOC. (Anderson Deel. at 3). 
_ . 
5
~n his Petition, Petitioner alleges that after Mr. An<:lerson reviewed his legal materials he 
contacted Virginia Smith of Zions Bank and •reported details only ~vailable fn Petitioner's legal materials.· 
(Pet'r's Pet 3S). The only specific documents Petitioner refers to are the "Chase proposar and "Shreve 
letters.• Id. at 3R, 3S. . 
2 
642 
In his M9tion and related Memorandum in Support. filed August 6, 2013, 
Petitioner requests that the Court "should disqualify the entire Utah Attorney General's 
Office and the contractorfrom further participation in this action for breech (sic] of 
confidentiality(.]" (Pet'r's Mem. In Supp. 3-5)(emphasis added). Petitioner in this 
instance, asserts that Mr. Anderson initiated the confiscation, reviewed his legal 
materials and thereafter seized seventy-seven {77) doc~ments. Id. at 3-4. Petitioner 
also asserts that the contractor, David J. Angerhoffer6, searched and read his legal 
materials. 
Discussion 
The Court finds that Petitioner's arguments fail as follows. 
1 The Work Product Doctrine 
First. Petiti~ner fails to specify the documents in his "legal materials" that are 
privileged work product. As noted above, in Petitioner's Motion to Recuse he refers 
· generally to his "legal materials including unfiled complaints, letters· to attorneys and 
work-product preparation of future. legal actions/' (Pet'r's Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss, Mot 
to Recuse, 2) (citing Pet. 3R-3S7), but does not provide to the Court, with either the 
filing of his initial Petition or his Motion to Recuse, a work product log or an in camera 
submission8 of materials he considers privileged, leaving the Court to speculate as to 
6Mr. Angerhoffer is also a Respondent in the entitled matter. 
7The only specific documents Petitioner refers to in his Petition are the 11Chase proposal· and 
•Shreve letters.• (Pefr's Pet 3R, 3S). 
8Petitioner, with.his.September 12, 2013, submitted six.(6) exhibits for In camera review. These 
Include three (3) memoranda from the contract attorneys to Petitioner, two (2) letters to the contract 




the type/nature of said. claimed documents. See S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. 
Automated Geographic Reference Ctr .• Div. of Info. Tech., 2008 UT 88, 1[29, 200 P .3d 
643 ("(M]aking an in camera submission of materials -that counsel· contends are 
privileged is a practice both long-standing and routine in cases involving claims of 
privilege." (citation and quotations omitted)). Moreover, Petitioner fails to establish the 
grounds on which his "legal materials" qualify as privileged work product. Id. (explaining 
in relevant part, that the party seeking to assert the work product privilege has the 
burden of establishing that such is applicable (citations omitted)). 
The l\vork product doctrine11 covers both fact work product and opinion work 
product. Id. at ffll 24-31. For materials to be protected under the first branch of .the 
work product doctrine, the material(s) at issue must (1) co~sist of documents or tangible 
things, (2) be prepared in anticipation of_litigation or-for trial, and (3) be prepared by or 
fQr another party or by or for that party's representative. ~old Standard~-. Inc. y .. A~ . 
... Barrick Res; Corp., 805 P.2d -164, 168 (Utah 1990) (citing U.R.C.P •. 26(b)(3)9). "Thafis, 
_protection for work product extends only to material that would not have been 
generated but forthe pendency or imminence of litigation." S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 
2008 UT at 1J 25 (citations and quotations omitted)(emphasis added). 
As for the second branch, opinion work product generally applies to those 
Adocuments (which] convey the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal 
materials do not refer or even Identify the •chase proposal11 or •shreve letters, 11 which Petitioner cites, both 
In his. Petition{Pefr's:Pet. 3R, 3S) and his Motion to Recuse, were the alfeged •confiscated" documents. 
9The current version is reflected In Ruie 26(b)(5). 
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theories of an attorney or party." Gold Standard I. 805 P.2d at 168. 
Before the Court considers Petitioner's "legal materialsn pursuant to the work 
product doctrine, the Court recounts the relevant history as provided by the parties, 





On March 30, 201 ·1, Mr. Anderson discovered that he had inadvertently 
disclosed certain confidential GRAMA protected documents to Petitioner 
in response to Petitioner's GRA~ requests. (Resp't's Opp. to Pet'r's 
Mot. vii)( citing An~erson Deel. at 16). 
Mr. Anderson addressed the inadvertent disclosure with then Deputy 
Director Robyn Williams and Steve Turley, Director of lnstitutio•nal 
Operations. Therea~er; in conjunction with UDC policy, Mr. Turley 
decided to retrieve the documents at issue._ Id. at viii (citing Anderson 
Deel. at 17'.'"18). 
On March 31. 2011, Petitioner's legal pouches were taken, unopened to 
the Warden's office where they were to be reviewed by the contract 
attorneys. Id. at viii-ix (citing (Bussio Deel. at 4, 6)). See also Exs. 310, 
10Exhlblt Three (3) Is Respondents• Exhibit It is a copy of a letter dated April 1, 2011,. issued by 
Mr. Angerhoffer notifying Petitioner that his legal. pouches were reviewed by the contract attorneys and his 
material would be separated, as applicable, Into one of four categories. Petitioner was advised nqt to mix 
materials deemed •privileged legal• with other materials. There is no Indication in the April 1, 2011, as to 
how Petitioner's materials were categorized. 
s 
411; (Anderson Deel. Ex. B); (Bigelow Deel. at 4-6); (Bussio Deel. Exs. A12). 
4. After the contract attorneys reviewed and categorized Petitioner's legal 
5. 
materials on April 1, 2011, (Resp't's Exs. 3-4), (Anderson Deel. Ex. C13), 
the materials, none being classified as "legal-privileged."14 were provided 
to the Warden on April 4, 2011. Id. at x; see also (Bigelow Deel. 4-6). 
On April 4, 2011, Mr~ Anderson reviewed the "legaf ... public" pouches in the 
Warden's office to ·retrieve the GRAMA protected documents he ·· 
inadvertently provided to Petitioner. Jg. ·( citing (Anderson De~I. at 23, 25-
31 ), (Bigelow Deel. at 9-11). 
6. After Mr. Ande"rson removed his documents,·Mr. Larry Bussio was 
·contacted to return P~titioner's materials to him. Id. at 1 O (citing Bussio 
Deel. at 11)· 
In light ·of the foregoing, the Court considers the "legal materialsn as addressed in 
fo~tn·ote seven (1). See supta·tn~ ·1. 
11Exhibit Four (4) is Respondents' Exhibit It is a copy of a letter dated May 4, 2011, issued by 
Wayne A. Freestone, contract attom~y. reviewing with .P~tltioner that the only type of legal material~ found 
in the seized legal· materials were considered ~legal pubnc• materials. Petitioner was also notified that 
lnfonnation as to the type of legal materials found was shared with UOC staff. 
12Chain of Custody log reflecting: (1) lnittal seizure of Petitioner's legal materials by Captain Paul 
Gardner 9n Marcil 30, 2011: (2) sea.ire storage Qf said materials also on Maroh ~o. 2011; (3) remova.I of 
the materials to the Warden's office on March 31, 2011; (4) rebieval of the materials from the Warden's 
office on APrll 4, 2011: and, (5) return of the materials to Petitioner on April 5, 2011. 
. 
13Provision FDr14/02.10 $Ubsec;tions {F) and(~) respectively, of the UDC rul~s provides Chat 
•tegal-prfyileged" pouches •may be inspected, but the contents shall not be read[,]° while~ "legal-public· 
pouches "shall be subject to normal Inspection rules and have no privilege against reading.• 
14Defined as •attorney-client correspondence and other non-public material Which would 
compromise the Inmate's legal position If disclosed." (Anderson Deel. Ex. C, FDr14/02.10(O)(2)). 
6 
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Petitioner's Exhibit One (1) is not subject for privilege under the work product 
doctrine. It is a memorandum dated February 8, 2011, generated by the contract 
attorneys informing Petitioner that zero (0) copies were provided. Although there is a 
hand written note at the bottom. the note indicates solely a mistake on copy expenses. 
There is no indication as to the party that authored the note. This single line does not 
constitute Petitioner's or the contract attorneys' legal plans, strategies. or tactics. 
Petitioner's Exhibit Two (2) contains two memoranda issued by the contract 
attorneys. The first, dated January 7, 2011, provides Petitioner procedural guidance 
~ and does not refer to any matter, subject, or issue specifically. This.does not fit within 
. the fact work pr~duct or opinion work product standard. 
The second memorandum dated March. 17, 2011, again provides Petitioner with 
procedural guidance and clarification _as to the type of materials ·that can be provided to 
Petitioner by the contract attorney~. This memorandum is inconsistent with· opinion 
work product. Moreover;. while it does reference the Utah Procurement Act, this single 
reference alone would not satisfy the three-pronged work product doctrine standard. It 
was not "prepared for use in pending or imminent litigation." S. Utah Wilderness 
Alliance. 2008 UT at ff 25 ( citation omitted). 
Petitioner's Exhibit Four (4)15 is a hand-written letter drafted by Petitioner and 
directed to the contract attorneys. The letter dated September 1, 2010, addresses 
. Petitioner's efforts in preparing an initial pleading including requests for case law. 
Because this letter addresses Petitioner's legal plans, it would qualify as work product. 
15Petitioner's materials submitted for in camera review does not contain an exhibit marked as "3. 11 
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However, the contract attorneys were the parties that initially reviewed and categorized 
Petitioner's legal pouches. see supra 5-6, and then forwarded only the "legal-public" 
materials. Id. There is no contrary evidence that would suggest Mr. Anderson either 
saw Petitioner's September 1,- 2010, letter to the contract attorneys or, that the contract 
attorneys disclosed the contents of said fetter to Mr. Anderson. · See (Anderson Deel. at 
-14-15, 24-31); (-Bussio Deel. Ex. 8). See also S. Utah Wildemess-Alliance, 2008 UT at 
11 33 ("fl1he mere existence of an attomet-client relationship does not ipso facto-make 
all communications between them confidential. a (citations and quotation~ omitted)). 
Petitioner's Exhibit Five (5) is also a handwritten letter dated September 11, 
2010, directed to the contract attorneys. The fetter is brief and addresses Petitioner's 
expectations of the contract attorn~ys in light of the UDC contract. Because it primarily 
involves t~e terms of the ~efationship be.tween Petitioner and the.contract-attorneys and 
the steps Petitioner expects· the contract attorneys to fulfill, it does not fall within the 
work product doctrine standard and/or·the attorney-client privilege1~ •. See:· Gold 
Standard, Inc. v. Am. Barrick Res. Com., 801 P.2d 909, 911--912 (Utah 1990)(citafions 
omitted). 
Petitioner's Exhibit Six (6) is a handwritten list. There is neither a date nor an 
indication as to the author of the list. Regardless, it would likely qualify as a work 
product because it is likely the reflection of Petitioner's strategy, plan or tactics. 
However, because the contract attomeys were the fil"$t parties to review and categorize 
1
e-[1]0 rely on the attomey~ientprivilege, a party must establish: (1) an attorney-client 
~latfonship, (2) the transfer of confidential information, and (3) the purpose of the transfer was to obtain 
legal advice... S. Utah Wilderness Alliance. 2008 UT at 1f33. 
8 
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Petitioner's materials and forwarded ~nly the "legal-public" pouches, there is no 
indication that Mr. Anderson saw or read the list See (Anderson Deel. at 14-15, 24-
31 ); (Bussio Deel. Ex. B). 
In regards to the "Chase proposaln and "Shreve letters," Mr. Anderson issued a 
letter to Petitioner on April 5, 2011, addressing the inadvertent disclosure of said 
materials to the Petitioner. (Anderson Deel. Ex. E). Mr. Anderson explained, in part, 
that the documents related to a Request for Proposal ("RFP"), which was commenced 
in 2006, were inadvertently provided to Petition~r in contraindication to GRAMA. Id. 
The "Chase proposal" is ~ bid proposal and is therefore, a protected record con~istent 
with Utah Code Annotated Section 63G-2--305(1 ), (2) (2011 ). Id. The "Shreve letters" 
included 11ames of individuals, who scored the RFPs, and the relevant scores given to 
parties submitting ·RFPs and therefore, is also deemed protected as per Section 63G"'.'2-
305(6). Id. Petitioner was pto\1,id~ with. a wod< product log identifying the specific 
documents "retrieved and ~ redacted version of the "Shreve letters." Id. 
Neither the "Chase ptopo$.ala nor "Shreve letters" qualify as Petitioner's work 
product First, these do~uments were provided by Mr. Anderson to Petitioner 
inadvertently. (Anderson Deel. at 16). Mr. Anderson was therefore, aware of the 
contents of the documents. Petitioner does not dispute this fact. Additionally. after 
reviewing the noted documents in camera, -the Court finds that said documents were 
prepared during the ordinary course of business proceedings and not in anticipation of 
litigation. S~ S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 2008 UT at 1{ 25 (explaining that 
documen~s produced in the ordinary course of business are not deemed work product 
9 
( citations omitted)). 
Finally, Petitioner fails to assert how the alleged actions of Mr. Anderson and the 
contract attorneys "breeched [sic] the confidentiality of Petitioner's legal actions in this 
action" and "taints the proceedings." (Pet'r's Mem. In Supp. 3-5). The letter issued by 
Mr. Anderson to Virginia Smith of Zions Bankcorporation, followed a telephone 
conversation initiated by Ms. Smith to Mr. Anderson, a "few weeks" before April 6, 2011. 
(Anderson D~cl. Ex. A). The letter references Petitioner's complaint filed with the Office 
of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC") against Zions. Id. 
This. Court has already determined, see supra 3-9, that the d.ocuments asserted 
as privileged by Petitioner were either not protected and/or were not disclosed to· Mr. 
Anderson. Furth~rmore, Petitioner does not claim .that his request for relief with either 
this Court or the. OCC was denied .pursuant .to the alleged .breach of his "legal 
. , . .. , 
materials.11 Nor does:.,Petition~r assert ·that.he has missed Go,y.rt elates, was otherwise 
unable to make·timely filings, or was barred access to the courts due to the alieged 
bre~ch. See e.g .. Clemmons v •. Davies, f36 F.3d 1166, *417 (10th Cir. 1996). 
Based uppn the foregoing, the Court finds: (1) the documents claimed to be 
privileged by Petitioner do not fall under the work product doctrine; (2) the alleged 
11
•c1Jn instances in which a prison·er aH~es that the seizure of legal materials has deprived him of 
his constitutional right of a~ to the courts~ut does not allege a complete denial of access to legal 
resources~e mf!$f establls~ that he has been prejudiced by the defendant's actions In order to pravall. • . 
• (l]he §eventh. qlrcutl exptalned the required showing of prejudfce· as some quantµm of detriment 
caused by the,cflafl~ns,ed conduct ot,tate officials resulting in the lntemsption and/or d~lay ofplalntiffs 
pending or contemplated .tJtlgation. This definition of prejudice does not mean that the prisoner must show 
that, absent the actions of corrections offldals, he would have prevall(!d In the underlying case. However, 
the pfisoner's prosectitlon of the underlying action must b.e affirmatively hindered in some significant way; 
there must be actual substantial prejudice to specific litfgatio·n. • (citations and quotations 
omitted)(emphasfs added). · · 
10 
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privileged documents were neither disclosed to nor seized by Mr. Anderson;· (3) the 
contract attorneys did not disclose alleged privileged materials to Mr. Anderson or 
otherwise breach18 Petitioner's confidential information; and, (4) Petitioner has failed to 
demonstr~te that he was prejudiced by the alleged breach. 
2 Disqualification 
Petitioner claims that because Mr. Anderson and the contract attorneys both 
gained access to his legal materials, the AG should be disqualified pursuant to "shared 
confidences." (Pet'r's Mem. In Supp. 5-6 (citing State v. McCellan. 2008 UTApp 48, 
179 P.3d 825)19). 
The relevant facts of'the McClellan matter center on defendant's former defense 
counsel who, before Mr. McClellan's trial, left private practice and was serving in the 
Utah County Attorney's Office, the entity that was conducting Mr. McClellan's 
prosecution. 200~ ·UT at.114. <;>n the matter of the effect of the "cpnflict of interest" 
created when the fonner defense counsel became associated·with the public office 
responsible for Mr. McClellan's prosecution, the Utah Supreme C~urt held thatin such 
an instance it would not adopt a per se rule of disqualification. Jg. at 1( 19. Rather, the 
McClellan court looked to the rule it adopted in State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851 (Utah 
_
18Petitioner does not assert Qr argue a distinct breach of attorney-client privilege claim against the 
conttact attorneys. (Pet'r's Mem. In Supp. 3-6). Rather, Petitioner argues that (1) the AG and the contract 
attom,ys breached his. confidenti~lity, (2)· Mr. Anderson and the contract attorneys threat~n to tainUhe 
proceedings, and, (3) the AG and the contractor should be dlsqualiijed. lg. The claim for disqualification 
. of thf! contract attorneys Is n~ a~d wa$ not asserted In his Motion to Recuse.· (Pet'r's Opp. to Mot to 
Dismiss, Mot to Recuse 6). Disqualification was not a claim in Petitioner's initial Petition. 
19This case was reversed by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. McClellan. 2009 UT 50, 216 P.3d 
956. 
II 
1992), which prohibited a· part-time city prosecutor from assisting in the defense of an 
accused because such "dual representation would jeopardizeD the vital interests· of the 
criminal justice system. 0 Id. at 1J 20 ( quotations omitted). The McClellan court in 
adopting the rule established in Brown, were also guided by the Rules of Professional 
Conduct, Rule 1.9(a) (2009), and Rule 1.10. The court expla.ined: 
[UJn~er rule 1.9(a), a tanner defense attorney is prohibited from 
participating in the prosecution of his or her former client "in the same or a 
substantially related matter" absent that client's "informed consent, 
confirmed in writing." Utah Rules of Prof'I Conduct R. 1.9{a) (2009). 
Ordinarily,, s_uch a ·conflict of intere~t is attributed to all members of a 
disqualified attorney's finn. Id. R. 1.1 o. However, the Rules of 
Professional C()nduct contemplate th~t the confli~ need· not be generally 
attri~uted if "the personally disqualified lawyer is tim.ely screened from any 
participation ,n the matter and is apportiqned no parf of the fee therefrom." 
Id. R.1.-10{c)(1 )". ·While thi~ role applies specifically only to attorneys 
working.irtthe private s~ctor, it demonstrates our preference for screening 
<>¥er per se disqualification of ·an entire group of associated attorneys .. 
Id.· at ,r 21 (emph~sis added).· _· 
The curre_nt version· of Rule 1.9 provides in relevant part:_· 
. (a)A iawyer Who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall 
not thereaft~r -represent another perso~ in the same -or a substantially 
related matter In which that person's interests are materially adverse to 
the intere·sts of the formetclient unless the former client gives informed 
consent. confirmed in writing. 
(b) A lawyer shall not knowingly represent a person in the same or 
a substantially related matter in which a firm with whfch·the lawyer 
formerlywas associated had previously represented a client 
(b)(1) whose interests are materially adverse to that person; and 
(b)(2) ab9ut whom the lawyer had acquired information protected 
by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c) that is.material to the matter; unless the 
- former client gives informed con$ent, confinned ·in writing. · 
(2013)(emphasis added). 
Rule 1.10 also provides, in relevant part: 
12 
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(c) When a lawyer becomes associated with a firm, no lawyer 
associated in the finn shall knowingly represent a person in a matter in 
which that lawyer is disqualified under Rule 1.9 unless: 
(c){1) the personally disqualified lawyer is timely screened from any 
participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee 
therefrom, and 
{c)(2) written notice is promptly given to any affected fonner client 
(e) The disqualification of lawyers associated in a firm with former 
or current government lawyers is governed by Rule 1.1120• 
(f) An office of government lawyers who serve as counsel to a 
governmental entity such as the office of the Utah Attorney General, the 
United States Attorney, or a district, county, or city attorney does not 
constitute a "fiim" for purposes of Rule 1. 10 conflict imputation. 
( emphasis added). 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds that neither McClellan nor Rules 1.9, 
t.10, or 1.11 of the Rules of Professional Conduct apply to Petitioner's claim. First, 
neither Mr. Anderson, nor any other member of the AG, has represented or is currently 
representing Petitioner in the entitled matter. Petitioner concedes this in his Reply 
·Memorandum. (Pefr's ReplyMem. 7). See also Utah St. Bar Eth. Op. No. 142, 1994 
WL 579850 (approved Mar. 10. 1994){addressing the issue of disqualification of the 
20Provides in relevant part 
(d) Except as law may otherwise expressly penni~ a lawyer serving as a public 
officer or employee: 
(d)(1) Is subject to Rules 1.7 and 1.9; and 
(d)(2) shall not 
(d){2)(i) participate in a matter ln which the lawyer participated personally 
and substantially while in private practice or nongovernmental 
employment. unless the. appropriate government agency gives Its 
lnfonned-consent. confirmed In writing; or 
(d)(2)(ii) negotiate for private empl~ymenfwith any person who is involved as a 
party or as lawyer for a party In a matter In which the lawyer is participating 
personally and substantially, except that a lawyer serving as a law cterk to a 
judge, other adjudicative officer or arbitrator may negotiate for private 
employment as permitted by Rule 1.12(b) and subject to· the conditions stated In 
Rule 1.12(b). 
13 
entire office of the Attorney-General). Moreover, the contract attorneys are 
independent contractors, not employees of the UDC or the State of Utah, (Anderson 
Deel. Ex. B, p.6, at 15), who were C(?ntracted to provide as~istance to UDC inmates 
generally, in the drafting and filing of pleadings. ·Id. at pp. 8-10. While Petitioner has 
included Mr. Anderson and the contract attorneys as Respondents, as well as, the UDC 
and individual employees of the UDC, no evidence has been provided that because Mr. 
Anderson and the contract attorneys are Respondents, as well as, "opposing counsel1121 
that there is an Inherent conflict of interest .or "shared confidences. "22 
Conclusion 
Based upon the foregoing, the C~urt HEREBY·OENIES Petitioner's Motion to 
Disqualify. Furthe~ore, cons,stent with the holding ii'.' Smith v. Batchelor, 832 P.2d 
467,474 (Utah 1992)~ Petitioner's Motion for Award of Costs is also QENIED. 
This: Ruling stands as ·the Order of the Court No, further order is required~ 
Dated this 19th day of January, 2014. 
.BY THE COURT: 
211n the entitled matter, Ms. Amanda N. Montague of the Office of the Attomey General, is serving 
as counsel for Respondents. 
'D.As previously ad~ressed, Hf! supra pp~ 3-11, P~tltioner failed to present any evidence that the 




CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy Qf the foregoing Ruling dated 
this -1l day of January. 2014, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Reginald WiHiams 
Inmate No. 4620 
Utah State. Prison 
P~O. Box 250 
Draper, UT 84020 
Amanda ·N •. Montagu~ 
OFFICE OF' THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
P.O. Box 140812 
160 ~ast 300 SQuth 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0812 
. . 
CLERK OF COURT~ 
15 
~ ADDENDUM ''B'' 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
. IUl O 1 . !fJf'f 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, SALT LAKf!-CO! INTY · 




UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTIONS, ALFRED C. BIGELOW, 
STEVE TURLEY, CRAIG BALLS, 
LARRY.BUSSIO, MICHELLE 
BARTLETT, CAPTAIN GARDNER, MIKE 
HADDON, THOMAS PATTERSON, 
GINA PROCTOR, GARY SESSIONS, 
DAVID J. ANGERHOFFER, WAYNE A. 




Case No. 110918680 
Judge: L.A. DEVER 
The above matter is before the Court on Petitioners Second Amended Petition 
for Extraordinary Relief pursuant to Utah Rules·of Civil Procedure Rule 658, filed June 
2, 2014. 
Background 
Petitioner submits the ten (10) causes of action as per Subsections 65B(d)(2)1, in 
particular Subsections (d}(2)(B) and (d)(2)(C). Petitioner maintains that his "interests 
are threatened by the ... -acts of Respondentsn as follows: 
1 Provides in relevant part 
Appropriate relief may be granted: •.. (B) where an inferior court, administrative 
agency, corporation or person has failed to perfonn an act required by law as a duty of 
Qffice, trust or station; (C) where an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or 
person has refused the petitioner the use or enjoyment of a right or office to which the 








The Contractor charged the Petitioner fees to photocopy legal materials 
without authorization. 
The Contractor and the Utah Department of Corrections ("UDC") refuse to 
provide the Petitioner constitutionally mandated legal assistance. 
The UOC refuses to regulate the Contractor's compliance with the terms 
of the Agreement. . 
The Contractor refuses to provide the Petitioner case law, court rules and 
statutes to research and litigate Petitioner's meritorious claims. 
Failing to develop and implement policies to provide altemative· tegal 
assistance when a conflict of interest exist between the Petitioner and the 
Contractor threatens the Petitioner's right to receive mandated legal 
assistance. 
The Contractor's faifure to prepare notice(s) of claim denied ~etiti~ner 
access to court. 
7. UDC's failure to place·tfie· Inmate Trust Fund Account ("l"FFA") out for bid 
threatens ,he Petitioner's fund$ held in the Inmate Trust Fund Account, 
with loss or misuse. 
8. UDC officials falsification of official records threatens the Petitioner's right 
to have accurate information about him in government files and denies 
Petitioner meaningful governmental· redress of grievances. 
9. The Contractor's refusal to prepare petitions for records request appeals 
under the Governmental Records Access Management Act, for filing in 
the Third District Court, ~gainst the UDC, violates the Petitioner's right.to 
governmental redress and access to the courts. 






Petitioner's right to privacy. 
Discussion and Analysis 
In considering petitions for extraordinary relief. the Utah Supreme Court held, "A 
[Rule 658] petition of any nature which fails to state a claim may be dismissed .... 
despite the lack of express authority to dismiss frivolous petitions under [65B{d)]." 
Lancasterv. Utah Board of P~rdons. 869 P.2d 945, 948 (Utah 1994). See also 
Williamsv. Dep'tofCorr .• 2013 UT App 159, 11102, 306 P.3d 821. In light of said 
standards, the Court considers Petitioner's claims3• 
Claim 1. The Contractor charged the Petitioner fees to photocopy legal 
materials without authorization. 
Petitioner's claim fails to satisfy the required pleading standard. That is. a 
petitioner's "obligation to provide the grounds of his entitle[ment] to relief requires more 
thati labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a- cause of 
action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the 
speculative level.ff Bell Atl. Corp~ v. Twombly, 550 U~S. 544, 555(2007)(citations and 
quotations omitted). 
2Holding: 
Williams has not shown that the trial court erred in treating the entire petition as one brought 
under rule 65B. In particular, he identifies no authority pennitting claims for ordinary relief to be 
bundled with daims for extraordinary relief in a single hybrid petition. A proceeding under rule 658 
is an extraordinary proceeding with Idiosyncratic procedural rules. A hybrid complaint would thus 
require the trial court to simultaneously-apply two different procedural regimes. Because this 
approach is unworkable, the trial (;OUrt had discretion to dismiss from a petition for extraordinary 
relief any claims seeking ordinary relief. 
(citations omitted)( emphasis added). 
3Although Petitioner referenced various exhibits throughout his Petition, he failed to attach any of 
the noted exhibits to the Petition received by this Court 
3 
Claim 2. The Contractor and the Utah Department of Corrections ("UDC'7 
refuse to provide the Petitioner constitutionally mandated legal 
assistance. 
The Supreme Court has declared that "an. inmate's right of access does not 
require the state to supply legal assistance beyond the preparation of initial pleadings in 
a civil rights action regarding current confinement or a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus." Carper v. Deland, 54 F.3d 613, 617 (10th Cir. 1995)(citing Bounds v. Smith, 
430 U.~. 817, 828 n.17 (1977))(emphasis added); Bee v. Utah State Prison, 823 F.2d 
397,399 (10~ Cir. 1987)("The Utah_prison's legal assistance program adequately 
assists all inmates in the preparation and filing of initial pleadings.") Petitioner 
concedes this in his petition paragraph eleven (11 ), "The Agreement requires the 
Contractor to assist prisoners in drafting and filing pleadings(.]" (Second Am. Pet. 11 ). 
Accordingly, any claims by Petitioner that the µoc and/or Contractor failed to conduct 
legal research on Pe~itioner's behalf_are HEREBY STRICKEN, see e.g. at°ld.1(1115, 17, 
18, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, and Petitioner's Claim TWO (2) is appropriately DISMISSED. 
Claim 3. The LJDC refuses to regulate the Contractors compliance with the 
terms of the Agreement. 
Petitioner's primary allegation under his third claim is that the Contractor failed to 
"conduct research, prepare pleadings, provide legal research materials and perform 
photocopy duties," and ·such failures "hinder[], delay[], and obstructa the Petitioner's 
access to the courts. (Second Am. Pet. p. 6). 
As not~d above, the Petitioner's "right of access does not require the state to 
supply legal assistance beyond the preparation of initial pleadings[.]" Camer, 54 F .3d 
at 617 (citation omitted).· Moreover, to successfully assert a claim for denial of access 
to the courts, an inmate must show (1) the inadequacy of the legal.assistance 
4 
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furnished, and (2) an "actual injury" resulting from the assistance. Lewis v. Casey. 518 
U.S. 343, 349 (1996). To satisfy the "actual injury" requirement a petitioner must show 
"that the denial of legal resources hindered the prisoner's efforts to pursue a 
nonfrivofous claim." Penrod v. Zavaras, 94 F.3d 1399, 1403 (10th Cir.1996). Finally, 
the non-frivolous claims involved must be "habeas corpus or civil rights actions 
regarding cun-entconfinement." Carper. 54 F.3d at 616 (emphasis added); Northern v. 
Barnes, 825 P.2d 6.96, 698 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) afrd, 870 P.2d 914 (Utah 19-93) ("In 
general, the purpose of extraordinary relief under Rule 658 is to test the lawfulness of 
imprisonment, and the propriety of any related proceedings(.]" (citation omitted)). 
Petitioner has failed to establish that he sustained any actual injury. 
First, although Petitioner maintains that his claims described in paragraphs 
twelve (12) are barred by the statute of limitations. (Second Am. Pet. p. 4), he fails to 
reference any particular statute. Id. at 1(19. Moreover, contrary to P~titioner's claim. 
while "petitions filed under [R]ule 658( d) ... should be filed within a reasonable time 
after the act complained of has been done or refused, there is no fixed limitation period 
governing the time for filing them." Nicolds v. Bd. of Pardons and Parole, 2012 UTApp 
123, ,r 3, 277 P.3d 652 (citing Renn v. Bd. of Pardons. 944 P.2d 677, 684 (Utah 
1995)(quotations omitted)). 
In addition, despite the fact that Petitioner was notified by the Contractor that his 
liFA claims were frivolous on or about May 9, 2013, (Second Am. Compl.1(1J 15, 25), 
he continues to allege that due to the Contractors "hinderence [sic], delay, and 
obstruction ... Petitioner has experienced a more than 3-year deley (sic] in filing his 
ITFA claims." Jg. at ,r 19 .. Petitioner has not demonstrated that his ITFA claims are 
appropriate as a claim for extraordinary relief. See Northern. 825 P .2d at 698. 
Based upon the foregoing, Petitioners Claim Three (3) is DISMISSED. 
s 
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Claim 4. The Contractor refuses to provide the Petitioner case law, court 
roles and statutes to research and litigate Petitioner's meritorious 
claims. 
B~cause Petitioner_ is not entitled to legal assistance beyond the preparation of 
initial pleadings, see supra 4, Petitioner's Claim Four (4) is DISMISSED. 
Claim 5. Failing to qevelop and implement policies to provide alternative 
legal assistance when a conflict of intere$t exist between the 
Petitioner and the Contractor threatens the Petitioner's tight to 
receiv_e mandated legal assistance. 
Petitioner's claim five (5) primarily alleges that "only the Contractor can identify a 
conflict of interest to the uoc· [and] [a]s such, the UDC has notmeehanism forth~ 
Petitioner to receive legal assistance to bring the claims-alleged E;iga_inst the Contractor 
in this petition~" (Second Am. Pet. 1J 29). Pet,tioner's claim is· self:00ntradictory. That 
is,. while· Petitio~er as~erts that without legal assistance he cannot assert claims against 
the Contractor, the petitions.filed by Petitioner, including the Second Amended Petition, 
contain Petitiol)_ef.s.claims asserted_.against the Contractor .. See e.g~ (Second Am~ Pet., 
. . 
Claims I, II,. IV, VI, IX). Accordingly, Petitioner's Claim Five-(5) is DISMISSED. 
Claim 6. The Contractors failure to prepare notice(s) of·c/aim denied 
Petitioner access to court. 
Petitioner's sixth claim stems from the alleged confiscation of his legal papers on 
or about March 31, 2011. (Second Am. Pet. p. 10-11). In particular, _Petitioner alleges 
that "[o]n May 16, 2011, [he] submitted a draft notice of [a] claim and a_ request for 
preparation to the Contractor. regarding confiscation of his legal papers. See Ex. X4• 
4See fn. 3. 
6 
[However], (o]n May 16, 2011, the Contractor refused to prepare the notice of claim." 
Id. at 10. 
Petitioner has failed to establish that ( 1) a claim under the Governmental 
Immunity Act of Utah, Utah Code Ann.§ 63G-7-101 et. seq., is an appropriate claim for 
extraordinary relief; and, (2) that the Contractor's refusal to prepare Petitioner's notice 
of claim is consistent with the standard of a violation to access to the courts. See 
supra pp. 4-5. Moreover. ·despite the fact that Petitioner's allegations surrounding the 
confiscation of his papers were not filed as a claim under the· Governmental Immunity 
Act of Utah, Petitioner's allegations were addressed by this Court in its Ruling of 
January 21, 2014. 
Based upon the foregoing, Petitioner's Claim .Six (6) is DISMISSED. 
Claim 7. UDC's failure to place the ITFA out for bid threatens the Petitioner's 
funds held in the ·1nmat~ Trost Fund Account, with loss or misuse. 
Because Petitioner has not demonstrated that his ITFA claims are appropriate as 
a claim -for extraordinary relief, s~ supra pp. 4-5, Petitioner'~ Claim Seven (7) is 
_DISMISSED. 
Claim 8. UDC officials falsification of official records threatens the 
Petitioner's right to have accurate information about him in 
government files and denies Petitioner meaningful governmental 
redress of grievances. 
Petitioners eighth claim stems from the UDC official's alleged confiscation of 
Petitioner's legal papers on March 30, 2011, and the related·chain of custody sheet, 
which reflects the possession of said papers by UOC officials. (Second Am. Pet. pp. 
12--13). Petitioner asserts in relevant part, that "[a]s a result of falsification of the chain 
of custody sheet and the IR-2 document, the integrity of litigation is compromised by 
7 
B~ssio's· deliberate attempt to conceal Anderson's ·possession, reading and seizure of 
Petitioner's legal materials.• Id. at 1( 38. 
The Court finds that Petitioner's eighth claim is an attempt of Petitioner to re-
argue his Motion to "Recuse"5, filed October 4, 2011, and Motion to Disqualify Counsel, 
filed Augus~ 6, 2013, which the Court addressed in its Ruling of January 21, 2014. 
Accordingly, it is STRICKEN. 
Claim 9. The Contractor's refusal to prepare petitions for records request 
appeals under the Governmental Records Access Management 
Act, for filing in. the Third District Court, against the UDC, violates 
the Petitioner's right to governmental redress and access to the 
courts. 
·· Petitioner has· failed to dem·onstrate that the· denial of GRAMA rectuests are 
appropriate extraordin-~ry claims under Rule 658, see Nodhem, 825 P .2d .at 698, and 
therefore, Claim Nine (9) is STRICKEN. 
Claim 10. Confiscation of Petitioner's legal material violated UDC's 
regulations and P_etitioner's right ~o privacy~ 
Because the Court finds that Petitioner's· tenth. claim is an attempt of Petitjoner to 
r&-argue his Motion to "RecusenG, filed October 4, 2011, and Motion to DJsqualify 
Counsel, filed August 6, 2013, which the Court addressed in its Ruling of January 21, 
2014, it is STRICKEN. 
5Petitioner misconstrues the tenn •recuse," In the context of Petitioner's Motion,· Petitioner was 





Based upon the Court's determin•ation of Petitioner's individual claims in his 
Second Amended Petition, ·as discussed above, and whereas some of Petitioner's 
claims are not in compliance with Rule 65B, i.e., include ordinary claims for relief, see 
also (Ruling, May 6, 2014, p. 3-47), Petitioner's Second Amended Petition is HEREBY 
DISMISSED. 
ihis Ruling stands as the Order of the Court. No further order is required. 
Dated-this 30th day of June, 2014". 
BY THE COURT: 
7The Court (1) ordered Petitioner to submit his second. amended petition in strict compliance with 
Rule 658 and, (2) did strike Petitioner's First Amended Petition in its entirety for including ordinary claims. 
9 
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